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The Yummy and the Yucky: Expressive Language and The Agreeable 
Nick Zangwill?? 
When tasting food or drink, we may exclaim: “Yummy!” or “Yucky!” or “Delicious!” or 
“Disgusting!”. What do these words mean? What do we mean when we use these words? And 
what are we doing when we use these words? In the neighborhood of these questions about 
language are questions about judgements of the agreeable. This is something Kant addresses in 
his Critique of Judgement (Kant 1928). But in this paper, I want to keep the focus on the 
language of the agreeable. It might be objected that we should direct our attention to thought, 
and language is only relevant as an imperfect guide to thought. Nevertheless, I hope to show 
that there is something distinctive about expressive language, which makes it interesting in its 
own right. 
Different parts of human language do different things. The idea I shall explore is that some of 
what we say does not aim to represent the world, but is expressive of non-cognitive mental 
states, such as feelings of pleasure or displeasurenot merely in the sense that the language 
can be used to be expressive of such states of mind, but in the sense that it is the dedicated 
function of these words to be expressive of such states of mind. In this paper, I make some 
remarks on the expressive language of the agreeable in the hope of understanding its basic 
nature and structure.  
I begin with some framing remarks about referential and literal language before giving a 
positive account of the expressive language of the agreeable. Once that is in place, logical 
properties of expressive language can be addressed.  
There is much to say about food and drink besides discussing the expressive language that we 
use to talk about it. Nevertheless, this language, I believe, has a certain centrality. Food and 
drink may have personal or cultural significance, and they may have political symbolism and 
the like. But in order to play these roles, they must have flavor, they must have a taste, which 
we may describe with expressive language. Food and drink do many things, but without their 
taste and flavor and the pleasure we take in these, it would not do the other things that it does.  
§1.  Meaning/Reference 
How is the primary function of words fixed? We might be interested in language in general, or 
in certain portions of language. In my view, the right approach to the general theory of 
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language is to understand it in terms of evolutionary game theory, which delivers a plausible 
general account of linguistic meaning. (I doubt that it has any real competitors.) On this 
account, linguistic conventions are set up by dynamic feedback processes that generate 
convergence on certain symbol-world mappings rather than others. These constitute linguistic 
conventions. Thus “dog” means dog because that symbol-world correlation has evolved 
(culturally), in the sense of being selected by negative feedback mechanisms, and which is 
dynamically stable in a certain community, within certain limits of perturbations. It is stable 
because divergences from the mapping are costly and continuing the mapping has benefits. (For 
two examples of an extensive genre see Nowak and Krakauer 1999; Nowak, Plotkin and 
Krakauer 1999.) Remark: game-theory here is not a theory of rational decision, but a model of 
complex interacting entities, subject to multiple feedback loops, which applies both to 
biological evolution (Maynard Smith 1982), as well as to cultural evolution (Lewens 2013). We 
are not utilizing game-theory in the sense of prisoner’s dilemmas, this is rather game-theory in 
the sense in which host-parasite ratios may be predicted. 
Such a view of language, as a culturally evolved institution, is, in broad outlines, the account 
originally suggested by Ludwig Wittgenstein, under the influence of the economist Sraffa (as 
Engleman 2011/2013 has emphasized), and then articulated formally, but in a flawed way, by 
David Lewis in his book Convention (Lewis 1969). The main flaw was in the over-
intellectualist attribution of ‘common knowledge’, which is (a) not necessary, and (b) 
intuitively and psychologically implausible (Aumann and Brandenburger 1995, Binmore 2009). 
But this flaw can be subtracted leaving the program in tact. The program has been taken up by 
game-theorists interested in dynamic evolutionary processes since that time. (This idea is more 
influential outside philosophy than inside it; Ruth Millikan 2005 and Brian Skyrms 2010 are 
prominent philosophers who have pursued it.) On this account of linguistic meaning, when we 
‘go on’ in the application of a word to a new case, we have no reasons (we do so ‘blindly’) but 
it is nevertheless no accident that we get it right (Wittgenstein 1953, section 219). We 
participate in the stable linguistic institution and there is a game-theoretic explanation of that, 
but participants need not know that explanation. They just have to be trained in a practice, that 
is evolutionarily stable. They have linguistic knowledge, which is primarily practical 
knowledge, without reasons.  
At the center of such a theory are symbol-world correlations. Such language is fundamentally 
referential. In standard cases, the function of a name is to pick out an object or event, and the 
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function of a predicate is to pick out a property. (The latter claim is non-Fregean; they do not 
typically function to pick out concepts.) Linguistic items thus turn out to be functional things 
(like tools) whose essence is defined in part by their history. The history of how a word 
acquires its word-world mapping is not distant and irrelevant history, but a history that defines 
what the word is for, and, as with all functional things, what it is for defines what it is.  
In order to get language up and running, there need to be dynamic feedback mechanisms 
encouraging convergence on certain symbol-world associations. This is referred to as 
‘signaling’ because by means of the symbol one player can signal a particular thing or property 
to the receiver of the signal. This, when a certain stability is achieved, is what it is for the word 
“Napoleon” to mean the man Napoleon, and for the word “yellow” to mean the color yellow. 
Evolutionary language-game-theory describes the mathematical mechanisms whereby these 
linguistic institutions come into existence in complex dynamic situations with multiple players. 
This is the basic idea of evolutionary language-game-theory. 
Given such linguistic meanings, we may have linguistic intentions and linguistic beliefs. But 
one of the main advantages of evolutionary language-game-theory is that these intentions and 
beliefs are not fundamental or necessary in the way that Paul Grice and his followers thought 
(Grice 1957). Indeed, evolutionary language-game-theory explains what Grice assumes. If we 
have beliefs and intentions with semantic contents, there needs to be something that is 
linguistic meaning that these thoughts are about. This is necessary if we are to intend or believe 
something with semantic content. Evolutionary language-game-theory gives us that.  
§2.  Belief/Non-belief; Literal/Non-literal 
To say that signaling language has the dedicated function of being referential is not at all, not 
remotely, not in the slightest, not even a tiny bit, the same thing as saying that the language 
conveys beliefs. Reference is one thing; belief is another. Sentences that refer to something may 
or may not stand in some systematic relation to beliefs about that thing. Language that conveys 
beliefs has no special status compared to language that conveys other intentional states. We 
could speak a language that only conveyed our desires and hopes, and we could speak a 
language only of jokes or only of questions. There is no reason to connect linguistic reference 
especially to the propositional attitude of belief. What is important is that the words refer.  
Another crucial point is this. Nothing in evolutionary language-game-theory means that we 
always use referential language to refer to what it is supposed to refer to. Donald Davidson’s 
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theory of metaphor beautifully builds on literal linguistic meaning to describe a use of literal 
words with literal meanings (Davidson 1978). It is a very large misunderstanding of Davidson’s 
view of metaphor to interpret it as somehow fundamentally ‘non-cognitive’. The uses of literal 
language that metaphor involves might derive from cognitive states or from non-cognitive 
states. It is crucial to understand metaphor correctly, otherwise the attempt to describe 
expressive language will misfirethe waters between the two being muddied. The two 
phenomena need to be separated. By a wall.  
Something with a dedicated function, such as a coffee-maker, need not always be used in 
accordance with its function. We may use a coffee maker to make coffee or as a paper-weight. 
There is artifact-abuse (Capra 2014). It is similar with linguistic functions. A word’s meaning is 
its function, which can be used and abused, like using a coffee-maker either to make coffee or 
as a paper-weight. One can use a functional thing, such as a coffee-maker or a word, either in 
accordance with its function, and one can also use it in a way that has nothing to do with its 
function. But the meaning of words remains the same in uses that accord with their function 
and in uses that diverge from their function. Indeed, as Davidson emphasized, metaphorical 
uses depends on literal word meaning remaining unchanged. Metaphor is a form of deliberate 
meaning abuse that depends on literal meaning (Zangwill 2014). A word may have the 
dedicated function of signifying a certain object or property, but not be used to do so. Its 
meaning is its function, but its use may be another matter. Metaphor does not signal a departure 
from referential language; it depends on it. That referential meaning is what is deliberately 
misused, or abused.  
§3.  Expressive Meaning 
In any particular area of language, there will be specific features that need a specific 
evolutionary game theoretic explanation and interpretation. Thus far, material object referential 
language has been the main pursuit of the evolutionary language-game-theory program. Logic 
and predication have not been much explored. Neither has expressive language for the 
agreeable—which is what I explore here, in the light of the above framework. In particular, I 
explore the language of the agreeable as applied to food and drink 
I shall pursue the idea that our language contains words with dedicated non-referential 
functions. (At the risk of repeating myself and being really really boring: 
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referential=/=cognitive; non-referential=/=non-cognitive; and referential meaning=/=referential 
use.) 
Let us use the word “aesthetic” to indicate matters of beauty and ugliness. (This is not Kant’s 
usage.) Whether aesthetic talk is expressive is highly controversial and should not be assumed. 
(Isidora Stojanovic (Stojanovic 2007), Timothy Sundall (Sundall 2011) and other quasi-
empirical recent writers on aesthetic language make this assumption without argument or 
evidence.) I wish to remain neutral on this question here. Hence my focus is on the language of 
the agreeable, not the beautiful. Talk of the agreeable is obviously and uncontroversially 
expressive. I put to one side the large question of whether aesthetic language is expressive, and 
examine uncontroversially expressive language, and in particular on the agreeable in food and 
drink—on what is ‘delicious’ or ‘disgusting’, or, more childishly, what is ‘yummy’ and ‘yucky’ 
to taste (in the primary literal sense of ‘taste’). 
There are agreeable things besides food and drink. A cool breeze on a hot day may be 
agreeable, as may be a hot shower on a cold day. And many aspects of works of art are 
classifiable in terms of the agreeable rather than other art-valuable categories, such as beauty or 
profundity. Works of art are complex, with many features and functions and different works of 
art have different features and functions. The aesthetic may feature in various ways in different 
works of art. Moreover, as Carolyn Kormeyer has emphasized, food and drink are also complex 
with various functions besides how they taste (Korsmeyer 2002). Food or drink may be 
nutritious or intoxicating, for example. There may be religious or personal family functions of 
food. And the visual presentation of food may be beautiful. Food and drink may have functions 
as complex as many works of art; it is not only for eating and drinking (Kass 1994). 
Nevertheless, they often please us by their flavourthe way they taste. And this is where the 
expressive language of the agreeable comes in.  
Not all pleasures in food and drink are pleasure in eating and drinking it. And again, not all 
pleasures in eating and drinking are pleasures in the flavor of the food or drink. The trouble 
with some very fat people is not that they enjoy tasting food and drink too much, but the very 
opposite. They do not enjoy tasting food and drink enough! They may enjoy the physical 
actions of eating or drinking, but this is more a pleasure in feeling the bulk of the food or drink 
descending in the throat or stomach (as Aristotle said<reference to follow??>). It is matter of 
touch not taste. This is not pleasure in the taste of food or drink. If they enjoyed food more in 
this way, they would eat and drink less of it! 
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“Yummy” and “Yucky” are non-referential language that we use in response to tasting food 
and drink. Such expressive discourse is very different from response-dependent or relational or 
subjectivist language, according to which such language represents relations to psychological 
facts. This would be referential talk. (Undergraduates are trained to grasp the 
expressivist/subjectivist distinction. But I am not sure that recent ‘contextualist’ or ‘relativist’ 
ideas about the language of taste do not confuse these two ideas. See, for example, McFarlane 
2014.) 
I take it that Kant is right that the predicate “agreeable” contrasts with the aesthetic predicate 
“beautiful” since there is an idea of correctness in play in judgments of beauty that is not there 
in judgments of deliciousness (Kant 1928; for defense of Kant on this point see Zangwill 2018). 
Those who do not enjoy smoked salmon are not wrong not to like it or to say that it is 
‘disgusting’ or ‘yucky’. However, the fact that I like it makes it appropriate, in normal 
circumstances, for me to say that it is “delicious” or “yummy”. That is a rule for assertion in 
accordance with its function. (I return to this rule below.) 
To say that there is no norm of correctness in judgements of the agreeable is not to say that we 
cannot mistakenly apply the assertion rule. If I have recently eaten blue cheese, then orange 
juice will taste odd, and vice versa. These are not circumstances in which to employ the rule of 
assertion, since the pleasure or displeasure should be taken in the food or drink in optimal 
circumstances. But that does not amount to a norm of correctness like the one we have for 
judgements of beauty, whereby the judgement that proceeds from pleasure or displeasure 
tacitly claims that the opposite judgement is less appropriate than it. (I explore this norm of 
correctness further in Zangwill 2018). Needless to say, or I think it should be needless to say, 
that the notion of ‘truth’ should not be brought in to illuminate any of these matters. Truth only 
makes a mess. We do far better to proceed with the idea of correctness.  
In a sophisticated early paper, Charles Stevenson described the ‘dynamic’ use of words and he 
distinguishes that from emotive meaning (Stevenson 1937). By ‘dynamic’ he meant what could 
be achieved by the use of language, which today we would call ‘pragmatics’. This distinction is 
important. The idea of emotive meaning, as Stevenson intends it, is not the idea of a 
‘pragmatic’ use of words, which is a matter of what the words can be used to achieve or cause. 
That would be a confusion. A pragmatic theory would in fact lose the distinctive idea of 
emotive meaning. A pragmatic theory would be nearly as problematic as contextual or relativist 
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theories. This is not the way to think of the expressive or emotive language of the agreeable. 
What is the right way, then? <<Check this??>> 
§4.  Expressive Predication 
We need an account of expressive predication. In fact, we need a far better grip on the notion of 
‘expression’ than what has been presented thus far, in a somewhat casual way. To do this, we 
need to construct a serviceable notion of expression, rather than rely on anything intuitive or 
historically given.  
Consider a handshake. What exactly does a handshake mean? It does mean something. And 
what it means is something different from a high-five. You don’t do a high-five when you meet 
the Queen of the United Kingdom. Another example would be Sraffa’s famous rude Italian 
gesture, which led Wittgenstein to abandon his picture theory of meaning. It certainly means 
something—‘something offensive. What do these gestures mean though, if there is no 
reference, no symbol-world institutions that constitutes their meaning? Well, so long as the 
right kind of dynamic feedback mechanism is in place, the institution, the hand-shake, can 
come into existence. Even if we, who practice this rite, cannot quite say what it means, we 
know how to ‘go on’ handshaking in the relevant cases—‘blindly’, but non-accidentally 
correctly (as Wittgenstein might have said).  
Suppose we have a feeling, a pleasure, for example, in eating smoked salmon on a Bath-Oliver 
biscuit with a little cream cheese, with lemon and pepper on top. We want to ‘express’ this 
pleasure, somehow. What notion of ‘expression’ might in question? Rosalind Hursthouse’s 
paper “Arational Actions” (Hursthouse 1991) paper is very helpful for our purposes. (Robert 
Nozick also discusses this topic in Nozick 1993: 25-36.) We perform many ‘expressive’ 
actions, in the sense of symbolic actions. We hear about our pay cut and smash our coffee mug 
against the wall. We stand up when someone important enters the room. We throw up our 
hands in despair. We have funeral rituals. Many things we do are like this. Anthropology books 
are filled with these phenomena, unlike philosophy of action books and papers, to their 
detriment. (Does a ‘rational planner’ make such expressive gestures?) Now there is no reason 
why such rituals and expressive institutions cannot evolve in a way that is similar to the way 
that literal linguistic meanings evolve, by feedback mechanisms. This is the kind of meaningful 
‘expression’ we need to think about—ritualized intentional activityrather than the 
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unintentional ‘expression’ of embarrassment in blushing. This is how to think of the handshake 
and the other examples.  
If this is true of ritualized non-linguistic meaningful behavior like the handshake, then language 
is bound to have the facility to have a similar expressive function. It would be odd if there were 
only non-verbal means of expressing attitudes, and only referential signaling was done in 
language. We can signal what we are thinking about, but we can also signal attitudes, both in 
conventional non-linguistic and linguistic ways. (Think of facial expressions.) Hencewhy not 
an expressive predicate? Perhaps referential predication must already be in place, and, once it is 
in place, the sort of expressive predication we have imagined can hijack it. Consider the 
importance of showing dominance or submission in a social group. There is a need for words 
that express the relevant feelings that feature in hierarchical relationships. Thus, we may 
communicate attitudes without describing or even referring to them.  
Steven Pinker nicely describes the way unambiguity is often inefficient in communicative 
interaction and ambiguity is more efficient and thus to be expected (Pinker 2007, Chapter 7). 
He describes and analyses various scenarios in which this is very plausibly the case. But for 
these scenarios to make sense, the ambiguity must serve to signal non-cognitive states, which 
means that we have a linguistic phenomenon (ambiguity) that has an expressive function. If so, 
an expressive predicate is also feasible. Not all non-referential language-games are expressive 
of non-cognitive mental states in this way, but some are.  
Let us now build on this. Such expressive conventions mean that we can be insincere and 
deceptive—which is sometimes very important. It is often said, with the air of a platitude, that 
language is a means of communication, but as a generalization this is piously optimistic. We 
can use language to lie and conceal, and this is part of its point. It is not an extra bonus. The 
possibility of insincerity is important for both referential and expressive language.  
Furthermore, and relatedly, since symbolic activity is intentional, we can distance ourselves 
from our symbolical actions, for many purposes. This means—and perhaps this is a central idea 
of Simon Blackburn’s work on expressivism, which we will build on—we can reflect on 
attitudes; and we can discuss them with others (Blackburn 1984: 192, Blackburn 1998: 14). (An 
ironic Niezschean speculation would be that the possibility of moral thought depends on the 
ability to deceive!) 
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Expressive language thus would have a point. It would meet a need. This is crucial, since we 
want to know why we deploy these language forms, not merely that they are possible or even 
actual. But the point of such language-games need lie neither in reference to properties or 
objects in the world, nor in the possibility of correctness in attitude or judgement of the sort that 
we see in the language of beauty or morality. Expressive predication in the case of judgements 
of the agreeable raises different issues from those surrounding normative judgements where 
there an aspiration to correctness in judgement. 
With a predicate, we can deliberate about yumminess and yuckiness. We can plan for 
yumminess. We can regret yuckiness. And so on. Without a predicate, such reflective thinking 
would be impossible. Furthermore, we need a predicate not just to reflect on our judgements, 
but also to agree or disagree with others. Suppose you say “X is delicious”. I can reply: “I agree 
with that”. With what? Well, that it is delicious. With a predicate, I can talk about what you like 
and about your liking. I can reply “That’s true”, or “No I disagree”.  But without a predicate, I 
can only repeat your “yummy” or say “yuck” instead. I can only imitate you or do the opposite. 
But I cannot agree with you or disagree with you. I am merely similar or different from you. 
With a predicate, all this changes. With a predicate, I can reply not only “yummy”, but “It is 
yummy”, and you can then agree with my statement “It is yummy”. And you can disagree 
saying “No it is too salty; it is yucky and not yummy”. We can say that the food or drink is 
“yummy” and others can agree or disagree. We can discuss it. We can agree to differ. So 
expressive predication has an interpersonal point as well as a first-personal reflective point. 
Thus we can see why a dedicated expressive language could evolve and how it would have a 
point. Or rather it evolves because it has a point. An expressive predicate would serve a need 
and because of that could come into existence in familiar evolutionary language-game-theoretic 
ways. Language-games that fulfill these needs would be encouraged and those that do worse at 
fulfilling these needs would be discouraged. Cultural evolution would thus throw up stable 
language-games that are expressive institutions surrounding the pleasures we take in eating and 
drinking.  
§5.  The Frege-Geach Problem for the Agreeable 
The point about the point of expressive predication allows us to make progress in 
understanding some issues that a full account of expressive prediction should address.  
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in The Monist following peer review. The version of 
record Nick Zangwill, The Yummy and the Yucky: Expressive Language and the Agreeable, The Monist, Volume 101, Issue 3, July 2018, 
Pages 294–308 is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/ony007. 
10 
 
Once we have practices of expressive predication, then issues of propositional structure arise. 
We can wonder about the meaning of “is delicious” in unasserted contexts, such as 
disjunctions, conditionals and propositional attitude contexts. The sentence “X is delicious” is 
not always used by a person who is taking pleasure in X. And yet the phrase must mean the 
same in and out of unasserted contexts if the usual logical entailments are to be preserved. For 
example: “Either X is delicious or Y is delicious”: “X is not delicious”; so “Y is delicious”. An 
account of this logical validity needs to be given. This is what is called the ‘Frege-Geach 
problem’, and it is often seen as a powerful objection to expressivism about moral thinking 
(Geach 1965). 
It is not that we are tempted by realism about the agreeable as we are tempted by realism about 
morality and aestheticsgoodness and beauty. There is no serious alternative to expressivism 
about the agreeable. Nevertheless, logical structure poses a puzzle for that account.  
Before I make a?? suggestion, I want to note two points.  
??Funniness is another case of the agreeable, but here I focus only on deliciousness in food and 
drink?? 
Firstly, the way the Frege-Geach problem arises for judgments of the agreeable is instructive. 
The problem arises for our thought and talk about the agreeable—the yummy or yucky—in a 
way that is different from the way it arises for morality and aesthetics. Once we have an 
expressive predicate and practices of expressive predicate for the agreeable, a Frege-Geach 
problem arises without a robust notion of correctness being in play. Furthermore, the fact that 
the Frege-Geach problem arises for the agreeable without notions of correctness in judgement 
casts light on what has to be done in areas, such as ethics or aesthetics on expressivist 
interpretations, where there are claims to correctness. Moral and aesthetic thought are subject 
to quite a robust conception of correctness in judgement. Two opposite judgements cannot both 
be right, or correct. One task for expressivism about morality or aesthetics, therefore, is to 
capture such normativity from the resources of expressivism. In those areas, the solution to the 
two problemsthe normativity and Frege-Geach problemswill need to be integrated with 
each other. But such normativity is not in question for judgements of the agreeable, so 
expressivism about the agreeable is free of this integration problem. 
Secondly, given expressive predication, we can say “If x is delicious then so is y” or “Either x 
or y is delicious”. Or “Katy thinks that ice-cream is delicious”. Once we have predication, we 
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can construct complex sentences, given the logical words that are available from the rest of 
language. But predicativity is not sufficient to solve the Frege-Geach problem for 
deliciousness, because it does not solve the identity of meaning problem; the problem is that “is 
delicious” means the same in and out of embedded contexts. Without that, the intuitive logical 
entailments fail. The availability of sentential form plus the availability of sentential 
connectives from the rest of our thought are necessary but not sufficient to solve the Frege-
Geach problem. For sentential logical form plus connectives do not explain how there is one 
meaning that can occur in and out of embedded contexts, which is necessary if the usual logical 




I suggest that an account of why we need predication is the right place to look. In particular, 
reflection on, planning for, and discussion of, yumminess and yuckiness means thinking about 
types of attitudes, ones that we might or might not have at the time of reflection. When we do 
not have the attitude, what we think of, w 
When we reflect, we may reflect on the kind of thought that we think of w 
When we do have the attitude. We do not need to actually have an attitude token to reflect on 
the type. Nevertheless, an attitude that we might reflect on without having it, is the same type 
of attitude that we might actually have and express in the relatively simple judgements “X is 
delicious”.<<??>> Thus what we mean in the two cases is the same. This is the key to 
answering the Frege-Geach problem for the agreeable, or at least one major aspect of itor so 
I suggest. 
Reflective practical thought about the agreeable means thinking in terms of types not tokens.  
 
That is, firstly, we can reflect not only on our actual token likings, but also of likings of a 
certain type, whether or not we actually have tokens of the type. And, secondly, we can discuss 
these abstract kinds of likings with others. And if we are planning for yumminess, we may not 
have a token of the liking yet; that is the point of the planning! From this we can see that this is 
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why it is useful to have a predicate But once we have a predicate, we have sentential form. But 
then given the logical constants we have the possibility of complex sentences in which 
embedded elements are not asserted. (Not just ‘and’!) Given that it is types of attitudes that are 
in question, it is those types that figure both in and out of complex contexts. This explains the 
identities of meaning that we need.  
 
Note again that we do not need a robust conception of correctness to achieve this, although 
robust normativity also needs to be explained where it exists. The point of the propositional 
structure might be different in cases where there are no normative aspirations, from cases 
where there are such aspirations. This is something that moral and aesthetic expressivists 
should take on board. 
The important thing, then, is the point of propositional structure for expressive language-games 
which involve types not tokens of attitudes. Given that point, what we might call ‘the point 
point’, we then have an account of the identities of meanings in and out of embedded contexts, 
which is necessary for explaining logically valid inferences.  
<<PA contexts??>> 
If apple crumble is delicious, then so is apple strudel. 
Apple crumble is delicious.  
So apple strudel is delicious. 
Pleasure in eating apple strudel can be concretely realized in various token particular pleasures. 
But it is also a type that could be simultaneously instantiated in London and Sao Paulo.  
???>> 
 
§6.  Rules and Meaning 
The, or one, basic form that the Frege-Geach problem takes is that “X is delicious” is supposed 
to be said by someone who has pleasure in X; but someone who uses “X is delicious” in an 
embedded context need not be having pleasure in X. So some other account must be given of 
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the meaning of “is delicious” in embedded contexts than its being used when the speaker has 
pleasure in X. 
Let us look more closely at the rule of assertion for judgements of the agreeable. One thought is 
that it is a conditional  
[If one has a feeling of pleasure of a certain type, in the right circumstances, on tasting x, 
then one must/may assert a judgement of the agreeable, that x is yummy.]  
Notice also that the judgement has no subjective content “I have such and such a feeling”, but 
its rule of assertion is subjective. In other words, it is a reflective judgement. Non-subjective 
expressive judgements have essential origins in a subjective rule.  
Someone might object that this account generates Wittgensteinian worries about ‘privacy’, 
since the person in question needs to reidentify phenomenologically similar attitudes on the 
basis of introspection, with no help from knowledge of behavior. I think that there are no 
problems here: we can do that. Furthermore, the interpretation of Wittgenstein is defective; see 
Zangwill 2017.) 
However, the rule seems to generate a Frege-Geach problem since while that rule might seem 
alright for simplex non-embedded assertions, it gives us no guidance for what the rule of 
assertion is for complex sentences involving “X is yummy” as a constituent.  
Notice, however, that this rule for the assertion of the simple non-embedded judgement of the 
agreeable is a conditional, with an imperative or deontic proposition as a consequent and an 
antecedent with a subjective component.  
One response to the Frege-Geach problem, at this point, would be that we need a different rule 
for different complex constructions corresponding to the type of embedding in question. How 
would it look if we tried to formulate a rule of assertion for a conditional with an agreeable 
antecedent? Perhaps:  
[If were to have at attitude of a certain kind, in the right circumstances, then then we 
should have another judgement, perhaps have a belief or make another expressive 
jugement].  
There would be a shared subjective element of both rules for the categorial non-embedded 
assertion and the conditional. But should the idea be that the content of the conditional is given 
in part by the conditional rule just sugested? This is tempting but I think this should be resisted.  
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My strategy is to look sideways at the referential case, which will then help us to get it right 
about the expressive case, and avoid a Frege-Geach problem.  
What is the rule of assertion for “X is square”? It might be something like  
[If you have an experience as of X being square, in the right circumstances, then go ahead 
and believe that X is square]. 
What is of fundamental importance is that this rule does not give the content of the judgement 
that something is square. Perhaps if you grasp the meaning of “X is square” then you grasp the 
assertion rule. The meaning explains the verification; but they are not the same.  
This has much to teach us about the expressivist assertion rule. We should say the same as what 
we should say about rules for referential language. Expressivist rules do not give the meaning 
of expressivist judgements. This was part of the point of my introducing expressivist language 
by means of evolutionary language-game-theory. If we distinguish rules and meaning, then, in 
one fell swoop, that cuts out the main source for the Frege-Geach worry. In the non-embedded 
categorial case, the rule says you can assert “X is yummy” when X tastes good to you (other 
things being equal). There is supposed to be a puzzle generated by accounting for what “X is 
yummy” means in the complex case of an embedded occurrence of that sentence. But that 
dialectic makes an assumption which we should reject, which is that the rule is the meaning. 
(This was the error of Logical Positivism.) In a categorial, non-complex referential case, what 
we mean when call something square is not given by the assertion rule [assert it when you have 
the relevant experience]. Similarly, what you mean when you call something yummy, in a 
categorial, non-complex case, is not given by the assertion rule. If so, there is no Frege-Geach 
worry about our assertion of embedded sentences without the presence of the pleasures that are 
part of the assertion rule in the simple case. That mistakes rule and content, meaning and 
verification. What we mean in the “is square” case is given by reference; and we know that in 
operating with the assertion rule. That reference function is the same in simple and in 
embedded contexts. Similarly, what we mean in the “is yummy” case is given by expression. 
And that expression function is also the same in simple and in embedded contexts.  
This is also why the language-game-theoretic way in which I set expressivist language is 
important. The expressive meaning function arises as it does, as an institution whereby 
linguistic acts have an expressive function. That is what generates the being and identity of the 
expressive proposition. It is not how the speaker happens to feel when asserting “X is yummy”. 
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There is an important point about sincerity here. Suppose I utter “X is yummy” ironically. Then 
I have said what I have said, whatever feelings and pleasures I may or may not have. The point 
applies equally to non-linguistic expressive gestures with institutionalized meanings. If I stand 
up or take my hat off when someone important comes into a room, then I have expressed 
respect, whatever I am thinking. I may inwardly be seething with contempt. Still, I have 
expressed respect since that is what that gesture means. This is crucial for the Frege-Geach 
problem.  
Expressivist theories should never have said that occurrences of “X is yummy” somehow 
derive from pleasures had at X. That is too unstructured and casual a framework. Instead, I 
have suggested that there is a complex institution in which “X is yummy” sentences have a 
certain function. Expression means something like this or else it means nothing useful. (The 
model of blushing expressing embarrassment will not serve, for example.) 
It is the same with referential language. The person who knowingly utters the word “dog” or 
“blue” on stage, or ironically, still refers to dogs or blueness. It is a ritualized institution and 
once it exists one cannot, like Humpty Dumpty, try to make what one says mean something 
different, by some interior mental act. Similarly, again following Davidson, I do not mean 
anything different just because one is using words metaphorically.  
In these remarks, I do not take myself to have provided a full compositional semantics for the 
agreeable. But I do take myself to have removed one of the major reasons for thinking that it 
cannot be given. That reason given, when posing the Frege-Geach problem, presupposes the 
collapse of the meaning and assertion conditions of expressive sentences.   
 
<<??CUTThe function of referential language… is it to convey to the receiver what the sender 
is thinking of, or associates with certain public tokens? No. No the function is just to refer to 
what referent. Similarly, in expressive language… is the function to convey to the receiver 
what feelings to the sender is thinking of, or associates with certain public tokens? No.  
So expressive language is not really about communicating feelings from sender to receiver or 
about outer linguistic displays of inner feeling. Compare an actor on a stage uttering referential 
and expressive language. Whatever is going on in them, whatever beliefs and feelings they 
have, they nevertheless refer and they express in accordance with the ritualized institutions that 
constitute linguistic reference and expression. ??CUT>> 
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§7.  Consistency and Inconsistency 
It might be objected: what about consistency and inconsistency? This appears to be another 
problem for the evolutionary language-game theoretic account of expressive language. We 
surely disagree with each other when we say “It’s yummy” and another says “It’s yucky” or “It 
is not yummy”. And we disagree because what one says is inconsistent with what the other 
says. 
Thus far, we have achieved predication and sentential form; but that does not suffice to 
understand the mental acts that deploy such predication in judgements of the agreeable. To 
judge, even about the agreeable, is to exclude the opposite judgement. To judge that x is F is 
tacitly to judge that it is not the case that x is not-F. I take a judgement to be an act of 
predication. A question is: in what way does a judgement of the agreeable exclude the opposite 
judgement? And: how can it exclude the opposite judgement?  
One idea would be that this arises from the fact that the attitudes expressed in these judgements 
are inconsistent, in the sense that they are metaphysically incompatible. A person can have both 
attitudes; but something’s being one attitude metaphysically excludes that thing also being the 
opposite attitude. But then how do we get an inconsistency between judgements that is more 
than that?  
 
<<<??? 
Do we need a notion of logical consistency in order to have an identity of content in and out of 
embedded contexts that we need for the Grege-Geach problem? Without content identity, 
intuitively valid logical inferences will be rendered invalid due to equivocation. But, it can be 
argued, negation is an embedded context. So we need content identity to make sense of the 
inconsistency between judgements with the content p and those with the content not-p.  
Contents of judgements are important and an essential part of the Frege-Geach problem. But it 
is not all of it. A proper notion of consistency and inconsistency <<??>> is also essential. It is 
true that “x is Yummy” implies “x is not yucky”. But how is the judgement “x is yummy” 
inconsistent with the judgement “x is not yummy”? (Derek Baker and ??? Woods pursue this 
issue in the case of moral expressivism; see Baker and Woods20???.)?? 
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Once we have achieved predication, there is a sense in which there is consistency and 
inconsistency between the judgements, which is not merely that the liking expressed by 
“yummy” is metaphysically incompatible with the disliking expressed by “yucky”. We need 
consistency and inconsistency in what is judged, not in the judgements or in the feelings from 
which the judgements arise. The judgements expressed in “x is yummy” and “x is yucky” are 
inconsistent in that the predications are inconsistent, just as the judgements expressed in “x is 
yummy” and “x is not yummy” are inconsistent because the predications are inconsistent. This 
transcends attitude inconsistency.  
It would be implausible to argue that in order to account for inconsistency, we need full-blown 
realism about the yummy and the yucky. Equally, it would be implausible to argue that in order 
to account for inconsistency, we need the possibility of correctness and incorrectness in 
judgements of the yummy and the yucky. There must be some other way of handling 
inconsistency, which is, of course, relatively good news for moral and aesthetic expressivists. 
<<??Here we have a version of the negation problem, which many think is at the heart of the 
Frege-Geach problem (Unwin 1999). <<??>> 
We need a notion of judgement inconsistency that goes beyond attitude inconsistency and 
inconsistency but which does not require normative aspiration in judgement. My suggestion is 
the following. In the sense of “inconsistent” that we want: hope is inconsistent with belief that 
what is hoped for is impossible, and fearing X is inconsistent with not believing that X is 
dangerous. This is rational inconsistency. And the thought is that “X is yummy” and “X is 
yucky” are rationally inconsistent in this sense. Judging that x is yummy makes it irrational also 
to judge that x is yucky and also x is not yummy. Crucially, this kind of incompatibility 
between judgements is not possible because there is some idea of correctness and incorrectness 
in judgements of yumminess and yuckiness. The sense of consistency in question is unlike that 
in morality and aesthetics, where each of the opposite judgements in question has the ambition 
to be correct but only one of the two judgements, or rather at most one of the two, can achieve 
that ambition. The consistency and inconsistency that we want for the agreeable is judgement 
inconsistency. This is internal to predication; it goes beyond attitude consistency and 
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inconsistency, but does not depend on the judgements not both being able to achieve the goal of 
correctness. This is the middle path that we need to take. And the idea is that rationality gives 
us that. We can thus have a notion of consistency and inconsistency beyond attitude 
inconsistency, yet without normative ambition in judgement.  
Some would build on such an account of inconsistency to make for an understanding of 
negation for expressivism (Unwin 1999). I make no commitment to this, except to say that I am 
not unsympathetic. What I have said does not suffice, however. Still, consistency and 
inconsistency need to be explained whether or not we can use them to explain other puzzling 
phenomena.  
<<CUT??? Perhaps we need to understand judgement consistency if we are to understand 
correctness, where we have correctness. Some accounts of negation in contents deploy notions 
of consistency and inconsistency in judgement. CUT 
It seems that we need an idea of consistency and inconsistency insofar as we have can 
aspirations to correctness. For correct judgements exclude their opposites from being correct or 
true. But judgement inconsistency, explained in terms of rationality, is a basic idea that helps 
explains other things.  
§8.  Coda 
I have explored a way of understanding expressive language for talking about a crucial aspect 
of our experience of food and drink, which situates itself in, or not far from, the evolutionary 
language-game-theoretic framework that we have for understanding referential language. 
Much more work needs to be done to develop the account in empirical and mathematical 
detail. Such an account, I believe, would have explanatory power and is revealing of actual 
expressive language-games. Furthermore, that account is in a good position to explain the 
complexity of expressive language once we are careful about what expression comes to, and 
notions of consistency and inconsistency in judgements of the agreeable can be explained. 
Judgements of the yummy and the yucky may not aspire to be like judgements of goodness, 
truth and beauty, but what they do is sophisticated, interesting and important in their own 
way.  
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